Lookalike domains
A lookalike domain is a domain name registered to be misread for a real one. The attacker swaps or drops a letter, adds a word, changes the ending or uses a look-alike character from another alphabet, then sends email from it. The mail passes authentication, because the attacker really owns the domain.
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How a lookalike domain attack works
A lookalike domain attack works by registering a name close to a trusted one and sending ordinary, authenticated mail from it.
- The attacker picks a name the target trusts: a supplier, a law firm, the target's own company.
- The attacker registers a near copy: a typo (typosquatting), an added word such as billing (combosquatting), a different ending, or a look-alike character from another script (a homograph).
- The attacker publishes SPF, DKIM and DMARC records for the new domain, so its mail passes authentication.
- The attacker writes as someone the target knows, with a copied signature and a familiar subject.
- The message asks for something routine: pay this invoice, note these new bank details.
- The reader glances at the address, sees the name it expects, and acts.
What a lookalike domain looks like
A lookalike domain looks right at reading speed and wrong letter by letter. Megan Park works at Trotta, whose real domain is trotta.io. The other three addresses are not hers.
Real megan@trotta.io
Typo megan@tr0tta.example digit 0 for the letter o
Added word megan@trotta-billing.example a word joined on
Prefix megan@trotta.io.example.com the real name in front of another domainThe .example and example.com endings are reserved for documentation. A real attacker buys an ending anyone can buy.
A homograph swaps a Latin letter for one from another script that looks the same, such as the Cyrillic letter drawn like o. The two names match to the eye and differ to a computer. In encoded form the altered part of the name begins with xn--.
Signs of a lookalike domain
The signs of a lookalike domain are all in the part of the address after the @.
| Sign | What it means |
|---|---|
| The domain is one character off a name you know | A typo was registered on purpose. Compare it letter by letter with an older message. |
| A word is joined to a known name with a hyphen | Anyone can register a name plus billing or support. |
| The known name sits to the left of another domain | The owner is named at the right-hand end. The rest is a label the owner chose. |
| The name is right and the ending is new | The same name under another ending belongs to whoever registered it. |
The domain shows as xn-- followed by odd letters | It contains characters from another script. Treat it as a different domain. |
Why lookalike domains get through ordinary filtering
Lookalike domains get through because nothing about them is forged. The attacker owns the domain, so SPF, DKIM and DMARC pass. RFC 9989, the DMARC standard, says DMARC does not address visually similar domain names.
The message is often plain text with no link and no file, so a malware scanner has nothing to find. Gmail and Outlook do screen mail before delivery for spam and malware. A clean, authenticated message from a new domain looks like a new correspondent.
The FBI IC3 2025 report puts business email compromise losses at $3.05 billion. A request from an address that reads right is one way that fraud arrives.
When an AI agent reads the mail
An AI agent is not fooled by how a domain looks, and that does not make it safe. A model reads tr0tta and trotta as different strings. It has no built-in idea which one is the real Trotta.
An agent decides from context. If the name, the signature and the subject match what it expects, a model tends to treat the sender as the party it already deals with. It also acts in seconds, so the check has to come before the agent reads the message.
How to stop lookalike domains
Lookalike domains are stopped by checking the exact domain against what is already known, before anyone acts on the message.
General controls
- Keep a list of the exact domains your suppliers, banks and advisers write from. Treat any other domain as new.
- Confirm a change of bank details by phone, on a number you already had.
- Show full addresses in the mail client, not names alone.
- Register the obvious near copies of your own domain, and publish SPF, DKIM and DMARC so forgeries of the real one are refused.
At the door, with a pre-delivery inbox
A pre-delivery inbox screens each message while the sending server is still connected. Trotta Mail checks the sender of every message: SPF, DKIM and DMARC, lookalike domains and first contact.
Attacks, known and new, are refused at the door or held outside the inbox for a human. Mail worth a second look is delivered with the caution attached.
The verdict travels with the message, so an agent reads the warning as a field. An agent's API key cannot read or release held mail. See the security model.
No filter catches everything. A lookalike that sends a calm, ordinary message can still be delivered, which is why payment changes need a second channel.
Questions
What is the difference between typosquatting and a homograph attack?
Typosquatting uses a misspelling made of ordinary letters, such as a swapped or missing character. A homograph attack uses a character from another script that looks identical to a Latin letter.
Does DMARC stop lookalike domains?
No. DMARC proves that a message came from the domain in its From address. A lookalike is a different domain that the attacker owns, so it passes.
How do I check whether a sender's domain is a lookalike?
Read the part after the @ one letter at a time and compare it with an address you already trust, from an old message or a contract. If the two differ at all, treat the sender as a stranger.
Sources
- RFC 9989: Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC), sections 2.2 and 2.4
- Unicode Technical Standard #39: Unicode Security Mechanisms (confusable characters)
- RFC 5890: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA), definitions (the xn-- prefix)
- MITRE ATT&CK T1583.001, Acquire Infrastructure: Domains (typosquatting and homoglyphs)
- FBI Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2025 Internet Crime Report