Email spoofing

Email spoofing is forging who a message says it is from. The sender's name, the address in the From line and the domain behind it can each be faked, because the mail protocol never required proof. SPF, DKIM and DMARC let a receiving server check the domain. None of them checks the display name.

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How email spoofing works

Email spoofing works because a message carries several statements about its sender, and the sender writes all of them.

  1. The attacker chooses who to be: a colleague, a bank, the target's own domain.
  2. The attacker sets the display name, the friendly name most mail clients show. It is free text.
  3. The attacker sets the From address. In an exact-domain spoof it is the real address of the party being imitated.
  4. The attacker sets the envelope sender, the return address used between servers. The reader never sees it, and it can name another domain.
  5. Often the attacker adds a Reply-To address, so answers go to a mailbox the attacker controls.
  6. If the imitated domain has no enforced DMARC policy, the receiving server may deliver the forgery.

What a spoofed email looks like

A spoofed email looks like a normal message from a known sender until the hidden fields are shown. Here Megan Park of Trotta appears to write to Jordan Ellis.

The header of a spoofed message
From:         Megan Park <megan@trotta.io>
Reply-To:     megan.park@example.net
Return-Path:  <bounce@example.org>
Subject:      Quick favor before 3 pm

The From line shows the real address, forged. The reply address and the return path belong to someone else. In display name spoofing, the simpler form, the name alone is borrowed: Megan Park <office@example.net>.

Signs of a spoofed email

The signs of a spoofed email are mismatches between the fields that describe the sender.

SignWhat it means
The name is familiar and the address is notDisplay name spoofing. The name is free text and proves nothing.
Reply-To differs from FromYour answer will go somewhere other than the apparent sender.
The headers show SPF, DKIM or DMARC as fail or noneThe server was not authorized, or the message was not signed, for the domain in From.
Your own domain writes to you from outsideAn exact-domain spoof of your organization.
The mail client warns that it could not verify the senderThe provider saw a failed or missing check and delivered anyway.

Why spoofing gets through ordinary filtering

Spoofing gets through because each authentication check proves one narrow thing, and enforcement is left to the domain owner.

CheckWhat it provesWhat it misses
SPFThe sending server may send for the domain in the return address.The From line the reader sees.
DKIMA domain signed the message, and the signed parts were not changed.Whether that domain is the one in From.
DMARCThe domain in From matches one that passed SPF or DKIM. Its policy says what to do when none does.The display name, and lookalike domains.

A domain with no DMARC policy, or one that asks for reports and nothing else, gives receivers no instruction to refuse a forgery. Display name spoofing passes regardless: RFC 9989, the DMARC standard, lists display name attacks as out of scope.

Gmail and Outlook run these checks and filter spam and malware before delivery. A message that authenticates for its own unrelated domain can still arrive. Phishing and spoofing was the most reported crime type in the FBI IC3 2025 report, with 191,561 complaints.

When an AI agent reads the mail

An AI agent does not see a display name the way a human does. An agent gets the name and the address as two strings of text, and a model treats text as information. Megan Park, Trotta admin in the name field reads to it as a fact.

An agent also cannot see authentication unless the inbox passes it on. And the name field is text the sender chose, so it can carry an instruction aimed at the model as well as a false identity.

How to stop email spoofing

Email spoofing is stopped in two places: the domain owner publishes what real mail looks like, and the receiver refuses what does not match.

General controls

  • Publish SPF and DKIM for every domain you send from, then move DMARC to an enforcing policy. CISA, the NSA, the FBI and MS-ISAC recommend setting DMARC to reject. See SPF, DKIM and DMARC.
  • Enforce DMARC on the mail you receive, and show the full address in the mail client.
  • Confirm requests for money, credentials or data on a second channel. Authentication proves the domain, not the intent, and a lookalike domain passes all three checks.

At the door, with a pre-delivery inbox

A pre-delivery inbox decides while the sending server is still connected. Trotta Mail checks SPF, DKIM and DMARC on every message and screens the sender for lookalike domains and first contact. What the guard finds decides the answer: malicious mail is refused with an error, dangerous mail is held outside the inbox for a human, and mail worth a second look is delivered with the caution attached.

Each message carries a verdict, and its auth field holds the SPF, DKIM and DMARC results, so an agent reads them as data. A domain you connect comes with SPF, DKIM and DMARC records to publish. See the security model.

No filter catches everything. A message that authenticates and reads as ordinary can be delivered.

Questions

What is the difference between spoofing and phishing?

Spoofing is the forgery of the sender. Phishing is the goal: getting the reader to give up credentials, money or access.

Can someone spoof my email address without access to my account?

Yes. Forging a From address needs no access to the mailbox. An enforced DMARC policy on your domain tells receiving servers to refuse such mail.

Does DMARC stop display name spoofing?

No. DMARC checks the domain in the From address. The display name is free text beside it, and the DMARC standard lists display name attacks as out of scope.

Sources

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